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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, the University of Kansas has experienced political 
unrest,1 seen the rise of social justice movements,2 felt the pain and 
stigma associated with campus sexual assault,3 and witnessed professors 
and other faculty members make controversial statements while lecturing 
on topics that challenge students’ beliefs, force them out of their 
comfort-zones, and require them to re-evaluate how they view the 
world.4  In other words, the University of Kansas is a typical American 
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 1.   See Miranda Davis, Updated: Chancellor Bernadette Gray-Little and Student Body 
President and Vice President Discuss Race and Other Topics Amongst KU Students, U. DAILY 
KANSAN (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.kansan.com/news/updated-chancellor-bernadette-gray-little-
and-student-body-president-and/article_4dbfcd60-7e88-11e4-b390-f31cc5918abe.html. 
 2.   See Lara Korte, RCIH Pushes for Change Through Advocacy and Protests, U. DAILY 
KANSAN (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.kansan.com/news/rcih-pushes-for-change-through-advocacy-
and-protests/article_771e1eb4-bd66-11e5-90af-6f727f761cf0.html. 
 3.   See Allison Hammond, KU Added to List of Schools Investigated for Handling of Sexual 
Assault Cases, U. DAILY KANSAN (July 29, 2014), http://www.kansan.com/news/ku-added-to-list-
of-schools-investigated-for-handling-of/article_0cc904c4-56be-5435-bfa9-6585be710f53.html; 
McKenna Harford, Presenters at KU School of Law Holds Symposium About How Universities Can 
Better Handle Sexual Assault Cases, U. DAILY KANSAN (Oct. 25, 2015), 
http://www.kansan.com/news/presenters-at-ku-school-of-law-holds-symposium-about-
how/article_07eb266c-7b63-11e5-a460-837b9c2d3c63.html. 
 4.   See Lara Korte, COMS Professor Not Found in Violation of KU Policy After Investigation 
into Using Racial Slur in Class, U. DAILY KANSAN (Mar. 23, 2016), 
http://www.kansan.com/news/coms-professor-not-found-in-violation-of-ku-policy-
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university—albeit one with an exceptional basketball team—that, day in 
and day out, experiences all of the challenges, trials, and tribulations 
associated with bringing a large and diverse group of people together for 
the purpose of education.  However, in 2012 members of the Kansas 
State Legislature looked at this conglomeration of ideas, personalities, 
cultures, and emotions and deemed it to be particularly at risk of being 
attacked.5  It was therefore necessary, in the eyes of those legislators, to 
pass a law allowing for the concealed carry of firearms in all buildings 
on public college campuses within the state unless “adequate security 
measures” were implemented.6  That law, an amendment to the Personal 
and Family Protection Act, went into effect on July 1, 2013 but included 
a four-year grace period to allow universities to implement adequate 
security measures if they so chose.7  Therefore, as the law currently 
stands, all public universities within the state of Kansas that do not 
implement adequate security measures will be forced to open the 
buildings on their campuses to concealed carry firearms on July 1, 2017.8 
 The Kansas Legislature pointed toward student and faculty safety as 
its central justification for passing its campus carry statute.9  Advocates 
for the law alleged that without allowing the concealed carry of 
firearms—or other adequate security measures—in campus buildings, the 
University of Kansas, along with every other public college and 
university within the state, would be vulnerable to attack because the 
students and faculty would be unable to properly defend themselves, 
particularly against armed intruders.10  However this justification ignores 
another characteristic that the University of Kansas shares with the 
majority of American universities: it has never been the victim of any 
                                                          
after/article_26909564-f103-11e5-a024-27d56f9f2d50.html. 
 5.   See Kansas House Approves Changes to Concealed-Carry Law, WICHITA EAGLE (Mar. 
12, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article1088066.html  
[hereinafter Kansas House] (commenting on the bill that would go on to amend the Personal and 
Family Protection Act and allow concealed carry on campus). 
 6.   See Dion Lefler, Kansas Regents Prepare to Open Universities to Guns Under New Law, 
WICHITA EAGLE (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:02 PM) (quoting Act of Apr. 16, 2013, ch. 105, § 2, 2013 Kan. 
Sess. Laws 551, 551–53 (amended 2016)), 
http://www.kansas.com/news/local/education/article37900224.html.  
 7.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20 (Supp. 2016); see also Lefler, supra note 6. 
 8.   See § 75-7c20. 
 9.   See Kansas House, supra note 5. 
 10.   See id.; see also Scott Rothschild, Kansas Senate Advances Expansion of Concealed Carry 
of Guns, L.J. WORLD (March 26, 2013), http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2013/mar/26/kansas-senate-
advances-expansion-concealed-carry-g/ (quoting Senator Forrest Knox as stating that: “When a gun 
is in a school and harm is meant, there is only one thing that is going to stop that, and that is another 
gun”). 
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type of on-campus, mass-shooting-style attack.11  In fact, none of the 
public colleges or universities in the state of Kansas have ever 
experienced any such incident.12  Therefore, despite student and faculty 
safety being espoused as a central justification for campus carry in 
Kansas, the reality is that the campus carry statute will likely have little 
to no effect on the safety of faculty and students and could, arguably, 
even make them less safe.  What the campus carry statute does do, this 
Comment will argue, is undoubtedly have a chilling effect on the 
academic freedom of individual professors to control their classroom 
environment, to choose the topics on which they wish to lecture, and to 
facilitate challenging and, at times, controversial discussions with their 
students.  The campus carry statute therefore incidentally limits the First 
Amendment academic freedom rights of Kansas professors and is 
thereby subject to heightened scrutiny.  Ultimately, this Comment will 
argue, the Kansas campus carry statute fails that heightened scrutiny and, 
as a result, should be invalidated.13 
 Section II.A of this Comment will look at the background of the 
campus carry movement, detailing its origins, its spread across the 
country, and some of its successes in implementing campus carry laws at 
the state level.  The section will then provide a closer look at the Kansas 
campus carry statute that was passed and implemented in 2013.  Section 
II.B will then analyze the concept of academic freedom by tracing its 
historical background and then providing an overview of the Supreme 
Court’s academic freedom jurisprudence.  It will then conclude by 
describing the circuit split between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits on 
the issue of individual academic freedom. 
 Section III.A of this Comment will address the circuit split and 
provide analysis that seeks to resolve that discrepancy in favor of 
                                                          
 11.   See List of School Shootings in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_school_shootings_in_the_United_States (last updated Mar. 23, 
2017, 7:21 AM).  The only exception to this premise occurred in 1892 when a University of Kansas 
law student shooting of two students who were cutting across the property on their way back to their 
dorm.  See Two Students Shot, MORNING CALL (S.F.), Oct. 11, 1892, at 1, http://cdnc.ucr.edu/cgi-
bin/cdnc?a=d&d=SFC18921011.2.29.  However, that incident is irrelevant to this Comment. 
 12.   See List of School Shootings in the United States, supra note 11. 
 13.   This Comment will focus exclusively on how the Kansas campus carry statute implicates 
and affects the individual academic freedom of professors and other faculty members who work and 
teach at public colleges and universities in Kansas.  For an in-depth look at how the statute can affect 
the institutional academic freedom of the colleges and universities themselves, see Laura Houser 
Oblinger, Note, The Wild, Wild West of Higher Education: Keeping the Campus Carry Decision in 
the University’s Holster, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 87 (2013).  Similarly, while additional First 
Amendment challenges could be made to the Kansas campus carry statute—such as application of 
Pickering balancing or the public forum doctrine—those are also outside of the purview of this 
Comment. 
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individual academic freedom.  Section III.B will then discuss the various 
levels of scrutiny that could be applied to the Kansas campus carry 
statute and will ultimately argue that intermediate scrutiny should apply.  
Finally, Section III.C will apply intermediate scrutiny to the Kansas 
campus carry statute and will argue that, under the heightened standard, 
the law must fail. 
II. BACKGROUND 
 This part begins by providing details about the origins of the campus 
carry movement.  It then provides a brief overview of the current 
statutory landscape in the United States and outlines the Kansas campus 
carry statute.  This part also describes the doctrine of academic freedom 
by tracing the doctrine’s historical roots in both the German universities 
and the American professional organizations.  It then outlines the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding academic freedom before 
closing with a description of the circuit split that has developed between 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits regarding individual academic freedom. 
A. The Campus Carry Movement 
1. Origins and Current Campus Carry Statutes 
 The morning of April 16, 2007, a gunman, later identified as Cho 
Seung-Hui, carried out the deadliest mass shooting on a college campus 
in American history when he shot and killed thirty-two students and 
injured seventeen more at Virginia Tech University before turning the 
gun on himself and committing suicide.14  The next morning, before the 
shock of the Virginia Tech massacre had even begun to wear off, a 
number of students from states across the country came together to form 
Students for Concealed Carry on Campus.15  The organization’s goal was 
to even the playing field by eliminating state laws and “school policies 
that prohibit concealed carry on college campuses [and thereby] stack the 
odds in favor of dangerous criminals who have no concern for following 
the rules.”16  Over the next year, Students for Concealed Carry on 
                                                          
 14.   Christine Hauser & Anahad O’Connor, Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/us/16cnd-shooting.html; Christine 
Hauser, Virginia Gunman Identified as a Student, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/17/us/17virginia.html. 
 15.   Adam Weinstein, The Secret History of the Campus Carry Movement, TRACE (July 5, 
2015), https://www.thetrace.org/2015/07/the-making-of-the-campus-carry-movement/.  
 16.   See Interview by Suzanne Smalley with W. Scott Lewis, Bd. Member, Students for 
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Campus would begin to spread to campuses across the country with a 
network of student activists devoted to the cause.17 
 Since its inception in 2007, Students for Concealed Carry, as it has 
come to be called, has experienced remarkable growth and now boasts 
over 43,000 members on more than 350 campuses nationwide.18  This 
growth is largely due to the influence and support of conservative leaders 
including Morton C. Blackwell, founder of the Leadership Institute, as 
well as Larry Pratt, leader of Gun Owners of America.19  Surprisingly, 
the National Rifle Association has largely stayed away from the campus 
carry issue, preferring to pursue higher priority causes and leaving 
campus carry to the “gundamentalists” or “purists”20 who believe that all 
restrictions on gun rights are in violation of the Second Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.21  As a result, Students for Concealed 
Carry, like the campus carry movement in general, has been able to 
maintain its grassroots identity while quickly, and relatively quietly, 
spreading all around the country.22 
 Despite the widespread nature of the movement and its ability to 
recruit young and motivated student leaders, campus carry has enjoyed 
only limited success when it comes to the actual passage of legislation 
allowing for concealed carry on campus.23  In the first half of 2015, 
fifteen different states took up the issue, but only Texas was able to 
successfully enact a campus carry statute, albeit an extremely water-
downed version of one.24  In fact, Nathan Deal—the Republican 
                                                          
Concealed Carry on Campus (Feb. 14, 2008), quoted in Suzanne Smalley, More Guns on Campus?, 
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 14, 2008, 7:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/more-guns-campus-94233. 
 17.   Weinstein, supra note 15. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Id. (quoting an unnamed, former NRA lobbyist). 
 21.   See JAMES E. ATWOOD, GUNDAMENTALISM AND WHERE IT IS TAKING AMERICA 46–48 
(2017). 
 22.   See Weinstein, supra note 15. 
 23.   Michael S. Rosenwald, Guns Go to College: Everything You Need to Know About Campus 
Carry, WASH. POST (July 31, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2016/07/30/everything-you-need-to-know-about-
campus-carry/. 
 24.   Weinstein, supra note 15.  A trio of college professors from the University of Texas at 
Austin, are currently challenging the Texas campus carry statute in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas.  See Complaint, Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-cv-845 (W.D. Tex. July 
6, 2016).  While the lawsuit is still in its infancy (the Complaint was filed on July 6, 2016), the 
plaintiffs have already advanced arguments alleging that the statute infringes upon their individual 
academic freedom rights under the First Amendment and has done so without a compelling 
justification.  See id. at 10, 13, 15.  However, it should be noted that the Texas campus carry statute 
differs from the Kansas campus carry statute in a number of important respects.  First, in Texas 
people who carry concealed firearms must have a permit to do so whereas in Kansas, a constitutional 
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Governor of Georgia who has been given an “A” rating by the National 
Rifle Association—vetoed Georgia’s campus carry bill, noting “that 
‘colleges have been treated as sanctuaries of learning where firearms 
have not been allowed’” and that “he saw no justification to change 
that.”25  Therefore, when Kansas’ campus carry statute is implemented 
on July 1, 2017,26 it will be one of just a handful of states throughout the 
country that have similar statutes allowing concealed carry on campus.27  
However, even with such limited success, the campus carry movement 
has become like an evangelical crusade for young gun-rights activists, 
many of whom are committed to making a name for themselves within 
the grassroots campaign with hopes of using their successes to quickly 
climb through the ranks of the Republican party.28 
 Currently, ten states have statutes allowing concealed carry on their 
public college and university campuses.29  Each of these ten, including 
Kansas, has provisions allowing for anyone—including students, faculty, 
administrators, staff, and even visitors—to concealed carry weapons on 
campus.30  “These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kansas, Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin.”31  In addition, 
                                                          
carry state, no such permit is required.  Compare TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(b) (West, 
Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. Of the 84th Leg.), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20 
(Supp. 2016).  Second, the Texas statute makes no mention of “adequate security measures” and 
instead allows for the concealed carry of firearms in all public university buildings regardless of 
their features.  Compare TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 
2015 Reg. Sess. Of the 84th Leg.) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20 (Supp. 2016).  Finally, the Texas 
statute does not strip public universities of all power and instead allows them to promulgate 
reasonable rules and regulations for the concealed carry of firearms on their campuses so long as 
those rules and regulations do not “generally prohibit or have the effect of generally prohibiting” the 
concealed carry of firearms on campus.  TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d)–(e) (West, Westlaw 
through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. Of the 84th Leg.). 
 25.   Rosenwald, supra note 23 (quoting NATHAN DEAL, 2016 SESSION OF THE GEORGIA 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: GENERAL LEGISLATION—VETO MESSAGES (2016)). 
 26.   See discussion infra Section II.A.2. 
 27.   See Guns on Campus’ Laws for Public Colleges and Universities, ARMED CAMPUSES, 
http://www.armedcampuses.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2017).  In addition to Kansas, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Wisconsin, and Oregon allow concealed carry on campus but enable campus 
administrators to limit where concealed carry may be prohibited (e.g. through the implementation of 
adequate security measures) as well as, in some cases, who may and may not possess concealed 
carry weapons on campus.  See id.  Meanwhile, Texas, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, and Tennessee allow 
concealed carry anywhere on campus, subject to some state-specific restrictions.  See id.  
Information on these states’ restrictions on campus carry can be found by clicking on the states in 
the map on Armed Campuses’ main page.  See id. 
 28.   See Weinstein, supra note 15. 
 29.   See Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (May 5, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx. 
 30.   See id.  Each state statute varies slightly, with some including specific exceptions and/or 
qualifiers, but those variations are not pertinent to this Comment. 
 31.   Id. 
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Tennessee allows certain faculty members to carry weapons on campus 
but its “law does not extend to students or the general public.”32  This 
leaves sixteen states33 that ban the concealed carry of a weapon on 
college campuses completely34 and twenty-three states35 that leave the 
decision whether to ban concealed carry on campus to each individual 
college and university.36 
2. Kansas Campus Carry Statute 
 The debate over allowing the concealed carry of weapons on college 
campuses came to Kansas in 2013 when state lawmakers proposed a bill 
modifying the Personal and Family Protection Act.37  The proposed 
legislation sought to require the installation of adequate security 
measures at public entrances of state and municipal buildings (including 
all buildings on the campuses of public colleges and universities) to 
prevent weapons from being carried into those buildings.38  These 
adequate security measures were defined as: 
[T]he use of electronic equipment and personnel at public entrances to 
detect and restrict the carrying of any weapons into the state or 
municipal building, including, but not limited to, metal detectors, metal 
detector wands or any other equipment used for similar purposes to 
ensure that weapons are not permitted to be carried into such building 
by members of the public.39 
The bill went on to propose language that allowed for the possession of 
firearms in any state or municipal building40 that did not have adequate 
security measures so long as those firearms were concealed carried 
within those buildings.41  Finally, the proposed bill gave the governing 
                                                          
 32.   See id. 
 33.   “California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina and 
Wyoming.”  Id. 
 34.   Id. 
 35.   “Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.”  Id. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   See S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
 38.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013). 
 39.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013).  
 40.   However, despite purportedly being enacted to ensure public safety, the statute that was 
ultimately passed specifically exempted the state capitol building from its definition of “state and 
municipal building.”  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(m)(7)(B) (Supp. 2016). 
 41.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013). 
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body or administrator of all state or municipal buildings a four-year 
exemption to establish the “adequate security measures” necessary to 
prevent weapons from entering the building.42 
 The proposed bill enjoyed widespread support in the Kansas 
legislature and was passed on April 5, 2013, by a vote of thirty-two to 
seven in the Kansas Senate and a vote of 104 to sixteen in the Kansas 
House of Representatives.43  Governor Sam Brownback signed it into 
law on April 16, 2013.44  Ultimately, the pertinent language of the 
enacted statute stated: 
(a) The carrying of a concealed handgun shall not be prohibited in any 
public area of any state or municipal building unless such public area 
has adequate security measures to ensure that no weapons are permitted 
to be carried into such public area and the public area is conspicuously 
posted with either permanent or temporary signage approved by the 
governing body, or the chief administrative officer, if no governing 
body exists, in accordance with K.S.A. 75-7c10, and amendments 
thereto. 
(b) The carrying of a concealed handgun shall not be prohibited 
throughout any state or municipal building in its entirety unless such 
building has adequate security measures at all public access entrances 
to ensure that no weapons are permitted to be carried into such building 
and the building is conspicuously posted in accordance with K.S.A. 75-
7c10, and amendments thereto.45 
Given that the statute was enacted on July 1, 2013, governing bodies and 
administrators of state and municipal buildings, including those in charge 
of Kansas’ public colleges and universities, were given until July 1, 2017 
to determine what they were going to do to comply with the law: either 
install adequate security measures or allow the concealed carry of 
weapons on campus.46 
 Contrary to its widespread support in the Kansas Legislature, the 
campus carry statute has faced harsh criticism from university 
administrators, faculty, and students.47  Many fear that allowing 
                                                          
 42.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013). 
 43.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013).   
 44.   S. Substitute for H.R. 2052, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ks. 2013). 
 45.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(a)–(b) (Supp. 2016). 
 46.   See id. § 75-7c20(j). 
 47.   See GARY BRINKER & RYAN L. SWAYNE, KANSAS BOARD OF REGENTS STUDENT 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STUDENT GUN POLICY OPINION SURVEY 2–6 (2015), 
http://www.fhsustudents.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Regents-Student-Gun-Survey-2015.pdf; 
Sam Zeff, Kansas Campuses Prepare for Guns in Classrooms, NPR (Mar. 22, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/22/470717996/kansas-campuses-prepare-for-guns-in-
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concealed weapons to be carried on campus and in classrooms will result 
in accidents and escalated disagreements between students.48  In addition, 
some worry that the “fear of violence could discourage civil discourse, 
with students afraid to speak their minds ‘because of their worry that 
someone might react with armed violence instead of thoughtful 
debate.’”49  To quantify this reaction, a survey was sent out to 
administrators, faculty, and employees at all of the Kansas Board of 
Regents colleges and universities.50  Out of the more than 20,000 
responses, 82 percent stated that allowing students to carry guns to class 
made them feel less safe.51  Additionally, 70 percent stated that allowing 
campus carry “would negatively impact their course and how they 
teach,” almost half said that they believed campus carry “would increase 
crime on campus,” and a full two-thirds of all respondents stated that 
campus carry “would limit their freedom to teach . . . and engage with 
students in a way that optimizes learning.”52  However, despite the strong 
opposition to the measure, the Kansas Legislature has rebuffed all efforts 
to change or repeal the legislation.  Given the prohibitively high cost 
associated with installing adequate security measures in all campus 
buildings,53 campus administrators, faculty, and students are beginning to 
resign themselves to the fact that campus carry will become a reality on 
July 1, 2017. 
B. Individual Academic Freedom 
1. Origins 
a. The German Influence 
 Unlike the campus carry movement, which is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, the concept of academic freedom has been wrapped up in 
higher education for centuries.  However, despite this long history, it has 
remained a concept that is notorious for being “ill-defined” and “poorly 
understood.”54  That is not to say, however, that nobody has ever tried.  
                                                          
classrooms. 
 48.   Zeff, supra note 47. 
 49.   Id. (quoting Mike Williams, President, Univ. of Kan. Faculty Senate). 
 50.   Id. 
 51.   Id. 
 52.   Id. 
 53.   See id. (“One community college in suburban Kansas City—a campus far smaller than the 
smallest of the state’s university campuses—put the cost of guarded doors at $20 million.”). 
 54.   Stacy E. Smith, Note, Who Owns Academic Freedom?: The Standard for Academic Free 
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In the late nineteenth century, the Germans embraced a definition of 
academic freedom that focused on “three interrelated principles: 
Lehrfreiheit, Lernfreiheit, and Freiheit der Wissenschaft.”55  The first of 
these principles, Lehrfreiheit, meant “teaching freedom” and “it referred 
to the statutory right of full and associate professors . . . to discharge 
their professional duties outside the chain of command that encompassed 
other government officials.”56  This, in turn, allowed university 
professors to control the “content of their lectures and to publish the 
findings of their research without seeking prior . . . approval” or fearing 
retribution by the state or church.57  In essence Lehrfreiheit “protected 
the restiveness of academic intellect”58—that is vital to the creation, 
exploration, and spreading of new ideas—”from the obedience norms of 
hierarchy.”59 
 The second principle, Lernfreiheit, meant “learning freedom” and “it 
amounted to a disclaimer by the university of any control over the 
students’ course of study save that which they needed to prepare them for 
state professional examinations or to qualify them for an academic 
teaching license.”60  This principle granted students the right to 
determine for themselves what they wanted to study and, in doing so, 
emphasized the German view that the university should serve “primarily 
as a purveyor of knowledge and as a credentializing agency, not as a 
parent surrogate or landlord.”61  This freedom was considered a “reward 
for achievement” and was cherished by students as a “precious privilege” 
that they utilized to conform their education to a style that best met their 
academic needs.62 
 Finally, the third principle, Freiheit der Wissenschaft stood for the 
concept of “[a]cademic self-government”; a concept that essentially 
defined the right of the university to handle its own affairs, generally 
                                                          
Speech at Public Universities, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 299, 307 (2002) (quoting Michael A. Olivas, 
Reflections on Professional Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third “Essential 
Freedom”, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1835 (1993)). 
 55.   Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in 
America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1988). 
 56.   Id. 
 57.   Id.  
 58.   Id. 
 59.   Id.  
 60.   Id. at 1270. 
 61.   See id. 
 62.   See Larry D. Spurgeon, A Transcendent Value: The Quest to Safeguard Academic 
Freedom, 34 J.C. & U.L. 111, 118–19 (2007) (quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. 
METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 387 (1955), for the 
term “precious privilege”). 
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“under the direction of its senior professors organized into separate 
faculties and a common senate.”63  This principle is inextricably 
intertwined with the first two, Lehrfreiheit (freedom to teach) and 
Lernfreiheit (freedom to learn), because without broad institutional 
powers of their own, universities and the world of academia “would be at 
the mercy of the state or church” and “dangerously vulnerable to 
government or religious censorship.”64  As a result, defining and 
incorporating this institutional level academic freedom was deemed vital 
to protecting the individual academic freedoms enjoyed by German 
teachers and students.65 
b. Academic Freedom Comes to the United States 
i. The Professional Standards 
 The American concept of academic freedom evolved out of the 
German tradition and emerged at the turn of the nineteenth century as 
“many American college graduates migrated to German universities for 
advanced instruction and returned persuaded that the Germans’ concept 
of academic freedom should be mirrored in the United States.”66  In 
response, the American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) 
issued its General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and 
Academic Tenure,67 commonly known as the “1915 Declaration of 
Principles,”68 in which it provided, for the first time, an American 
conception of academic freedom.69  This declaration “defined academic 
freedom as comprising . . . three elements: ‘freedom of inquiry and 
research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and 
freedom of extramural utterance and action.’”70  However, despite the 
1915 Declaration’s clearly being inspired by the Germans, it also 
represented a significant departure from the German tradition in that its 
sole focus was on protecting the academic freedom of individual 
                                                          
 63.   Metzger, supra note 55, at 1270. 
 64.   See id.  
 65.   See id. at 1270–71. 
 66.   Smith, supra note 54, at 309. 
 67.   Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, General 
Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 BULL. AM. ASS’N U. 
PROFESSORS 15 (1915), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40216731. 
 68.   See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and 
Tenure,  LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 3, 13 n.13. 
 69.   See Metzger, supra note 55, at 1267. 
 70.   Smith, supra note 54, at 310 (quoting Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. 
Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 67, at 20). 
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professors and not that of the students or of the universities as 
institutions.71  And while it was a significant step forward for American 
universities, it was largely a symbolic one as the 1915 Declaration lacked 
legal-enforcement mechanisms.72 
 A number of years later, the AAUP joined forces with the 
Association of American Colleges (“AAC”) and attempted to “condense 
and revise” the 1915 Declaration.73  This resulted in a document entitled 
Academic Freedom and Tenure: Statement of Principles, 194074 that, 
“[a]t its heart . . . endorsed the same core principles as the 1915 
Declaration.”75  On top of these core principles, the 1940 statement 
established three substantive rules: 
(a) The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the 
publication of the results, subject to the adequate performance of his 
other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be 
based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution. 
(b) The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his 
subject, but he should be careful not to introduce into his teaching 
controversial matter which has no relation to his subject.  Limitations 
of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the 
institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of the 
appointment. 
(c) The college or university teacher is a citizen, a member of a learned 
profession, and an officer of an educational institution.  When he 
speaks or writes as a citizen, he should be free from institutional 
censorship or discipline, but his special position in the community 
imposes special obligations.  As a man of learning and an educational 
officer, he should remember that the public may judge his profession 
and his institution by his utterances.  Hence he should at all times be 
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for 
                                                          
 71.   See id. at 310–11 (characterizing the 1915 Declaration as “adapting the German concept of 
academic freedom to the American context” in its focus on professors and not students or 
institutions); Spurgeon, supra note 62, at 123–24, 124 n.90 (explaining that the 1915 Declaration 
“acknowledged the German tradition” but was not concerned with the academic freedom of students 
or of institutions); see also Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. 
Professors, supra note 67, at 20 (“[T]he freedom which is the subject of this report is that of the 
teacher.”). 
 72.   Spurgeon, supra note 62, at 128. 
 73.   See Bridget R. Nugent & Julee T. Flood, Rescuing Academic Freedom from Garcetti v. 
Ceballos: An Evaluation of Current Case Law and a Proposal for the Protection of Core Academic, 
Administrative, and Advisory Speech, 40 J.C. & U.L. 115, 129 (2014). 
 74.   Ass’n of Am. Colls. & Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Academic Freedom and Tenure: 
Statement of Principles, 1940, 27 BULL. AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS 40 (1941) [hereinafter Statement 
of Principles, 1940], http://www.jstor.org/stable/40219177. 
 75.   See Nugent & Flood, supra note 73, at 129. 
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the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that he 
is not an institutional spokesman.76 
 Each of these rules highlighted a specific academic freedom and 
helped the 1940 statement become the “most influential expression of 
academic freedom principles” in American history.77  Since its 
publication, the 1940 statement has been endorsed by “over 200 learned 
societies and higher education associations” and has even been 
incorporated into the faculty contracts at hundreds of institutions of 
higher learning.78  As a result, the 1940 statement has had a significant 
impact on higher education over the past seventy-five years.  However, 
despite its endorsement by higher education and incorporation into 
faculty contracts, the 1940 statement, like the 1915 Declaration, is what 
is called “soft law,” meaning that universities must incorporate it into 
their official policies for it to have any type of legal effect.79 
ii. The Supreme Court 
 In what can be seen as a “Golden Age of Academic Freedom,” the 
1950s through the 1960s, the Supreme Court began playing with the idea 
that the concept of academic freedom should be more than just a 
professional organization standard and should have some legal force in 
the United States.80  Like anything with the Supreme Court, however, 
this process began slowly and evolved gradually over time.  Lawrence 
White, Vice President and General Counsel at the University of 
Delaware, has written an excellent overview of the landmark Supreme 
Court cases regarding academic freedom and, in doing so, noted that the 
first Supreme Court case to mention academic freedom was Adler v. 
                                                          
 76.   Statement of Principles, 1940, supra note 74, at 41. 
 77.   See Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U.L. 
791, 802–03 (2010). 
 78.   Nugent & Flood, supra note 73, at 129. 
 79.   Smith, supra note 54, at 312–13 (quoting William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom 
and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical 
Review, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, Summer 1990, at 79, 80).  Specifically at the University of 
Kansas, the 1940 statement has been incorporated into the Handbook for Faculty and Other 




 80.  See generally Smith, supra note 54; Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom vs. 
Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & 
U.L. 35, 43–57 (2002). 
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Board of Education,81 decided in 1952.82  In Adler, the plaintiffs brought 
an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the New York Civil 
Service law allowing civil service organizations to disqualify job 
applicants who were members of groups that advocated for the forceful 
overthrow of the government was unconstitutional.83  However, the 
majority of the Court came down against the plaintiffs and upheld the 
law.84  Justice Douglas, with Justice Black concurring, wrote a dissenting 
opinion in which he eviscerated the majority, opining that “[w]hat 
happens under this law is typical of what happens in a police state.”85  
Justice Douglas went on to conclude that “[t]here can be no real 
academic freedom in that environment.”86 
 It would be another five years after this initial mention by the Court 
for academic freedom to be seriously mentioned again; this time in a 
plurality and also, more significantly, in a concurrence.87  In Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire88 the defendant was convicted of contempt for refusing 
to answer questions posed by the State Attorney General as part of an 
investigation into subversive activities.89  A plurality of the Court 
overturned the defendant’s contempt conviction and held that such a 
conviction violated the defendant’s rights to “academic freedom and 
political expression.”90  In support of this holding, Chief Justice Warren, 
writing for the plurality, attempted to define what was meant by 
academic freedom, stating: 
 The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident.  No one should underestimate the 
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train 
our youth.  To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.  
No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new 
discoveries cannot yet be made.  Particularly is that true in the social 
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.  
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and 
                                                          
 81.   Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), abrogated by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 82.   White, supra note 77, at 804. 
 83.   Adler, 342 U.S. at 486–90, 487 n.3. 
 84.   Id. at 496. 
 85.   Id. at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 86.   Id.  
 87.   See White, supra note 77, at 807–10. 
 88.   354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 89.   Id. at 236–45. 
 90.   Id. at 250, 254–55. 
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to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.91 
This relatively “stunted embrace” of the concept of academic freedom by 
Chief Justice Warren would not, by itself, have been very influential.92  
However, when combined with Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire became the bedrock for academic freedom 
jurisprudence in the United States.93 
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter laid out his four 
essential freedoms of a university, stating: 
“It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is 
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.  It is an 
atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a 
university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may 
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study.”94 
Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence represents the first expansion of the 
concept of academic freedom since it was brought to the United States at 
the turn of the nineteenth century.95  It “‘broke important, new 
conceptual ground’ by characterizing academic freedom not simply as a 
set of rights possessed by faculty members but as essential freedoms 
belonging to the university as an institutional whole.”96  This remains the 
most extensive explanation of academic freedom that the Supreme Court 
has ever given, and it therefore serves as the analytical starting point for 
all issues involving the doctrine.97 
 Finally, in the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the 
                                                          
 91.   Id. at 250; see also White, supra note 77, at 808 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250). 
 92.   See White, supra note 77, at 808. 
 93.   See id. at 808–10. 
 94.   Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN & THE UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN 
UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (1957) [hereinafter OPEN UNIVERSITIES] (quoting Dr. T. B. 
Davies’ address to new students in Cape Town sometime in Feb. 1953)); see also White, supra note 
77, at 808–10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(quoting OPEN UNIVERSITIES, supra, at 10–12 (quoting Dr. T. B. Davies’ address to new students in 
Cape Town sometime in Feb. 1953))) (discussing the importance of Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence).  See generally Hiers, supra note 80, at 43–57 (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence and his use of the South African material). 
 95.  See White, supra note 77, at 809. 
 96.   Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New 
Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. 
L.J. 945, 971 (2009)). 
 97.   Id. at 810. 
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University of New York,98 the Supreme Court acknowledged the concept 
of academic freedom in a majority holding.99  The plaintiffs in the case 
were university professors in the State of New York who alleged that the 
State’s policy for retention and appointment of professors was 
unconstitutional because it prevented professors who were members of 
“subversive” groups from obtaining or keeping employment at state 
universities.100  This case was factually very similar to Adler v. Board of 
Education but unlike in Adler, the Court here ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs and held that the laws and regulations that denied employment 
at a public university solely because the person was a member of a 
“subversive” group violated the Constitution.101  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court explained: 
 Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom.102 
However, while Keyishian leaves the distinct impression that academic 
freedom is a valid right, supported by the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court has yet to clarify its definition or scope or how the doctrine is of 
special concern to the First Amendment.103 
2. Development of the Distinction between Individual and Institutional 
Academic Freedom and the Resulting Circuit Split 
 While the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1950s and 1960s made 
great strides in establishing and strengthening the American conception 
of academic freedom, they also left the doctrine vague and ambiguous, 
                                                          
 98.   385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 99.   White, supra note 77, at 810.  
 100.   Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591–92 (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3022 (McKinney 2009) 
(repealed 1958)). 
 101.   See id. at 607–10. 
 102.   Id. at 603; see also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First 
Amendment”, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 296–98 (1989) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (making 
several observations about the quoted passage from Keyishian); Hiers, supra note 80, at 42–43 
(quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (discussing the quoted passage from Keyishian and explaining 
its importance); White, supra note 77, at 810–12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 
603) (discussing the place of the quoted passage from Keyishian in the context of academic 
freedom).  
 103.   See Byrne, supra note 102, at 296–98. 
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creating many more questions than answers.104  Over the next several 
decades, lower courts, relying heavily on Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion in Sweezy, started to distinguish between institutional 
academic freedom and individual academic freedom.105 Richard Hiers, 
Professor at the University of Florida School of Law, wrote a detailed 
overview of this trend beginning with the case of Cooper v. Ross.106 
Cooper arose in the Eastern District of Arkansas and provided the first 
hints of a distinction between individual and institutional academic 
freedom.107  The case involved the termination of Cooper from his 
employment at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock.108  Cooper had 
been a non-tenured professor of history at the University and was also a 
member of the Progressive Labor Party, a communist organization active 
within the United States.109  As an avowed communist, Cooper taught his 
courses from a distinctly Marxist point of view and regularly 
incorporated his own beliefs into his lectures.110  University officials 
asked Cooper whether he would comply with a command to stop if the 
University issued such an order, but Cooper stated that he would refuse 
because doing so would be intellectually dishonest.111  As a result, the 
University terminated Cooper’s employment, a move that the court 
concluded was substantially motivated by Cooper’s communist ties.112  
While the Arkansas district court ruled in favor of Cooper in his 
wrongful termination suit, it also noted that the case was “particularly 
difficult because it involve[d] a fundamental tension between the 
academic freedom of the individual teacher . . . and the academic 
freedom of the university.”113  However, despite delineating, for the first 
time, a distinction between individual and institutional academic 
freedom, the court in Cooper failed to resolve the issue and, instead, 
decided the case on other grounds.114  Other courts would eventually 
                                                          
 104.   See id.; see also discussion supra Section II.B.1.b.ii. 
 105.   See generally Hiers, supra note 80, at 64–109. 
 106.   472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979). 
 107.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 64–65. 
 108.   Cooper, 472 F. Supp. at 804–05. 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. at 805. 
 111.   Id.  
 112.   Id. at 805–08.  
 113.   Id. at 813–15. 
 114.   See id. (holding that the University’s reasons for terminating Cooper’s employment were 
pretextual and that he was actually terminated because of his Marxist beliefs and membership in 
Marxist groups, and therefore concluding that Cooper’s termination violated the First Amendment 
without invoking the doctrine of academic freedom); see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 64–66 
(explaining that Cooper is the first case distinguishing between individual and institutional academic 
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seize on the distinction from Cooper and continue to develop the concept 
into the modern distinction that exists today. 
a. The Seventh Circuit: Piarowski v. Illinois Community College 
District 515 
 This development began in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, where a number of decisions delved into “the idea that a 
university’s academic freedom might be divided or divorced from that of 
its faculty.”115  Like with the Supreme Court’s development of the 
overarching academic freedom doctrine, this idea began slowly and, with 
a few exceptions, has remained relatively ambiguous and unclear.116  
However, a significant early step in this process was the establishment of 
what became known as the “Piarowski Doctrine” by the Seventh 
Circuit.117  The doctrine arose out of Piarowski v. Illinois Community 
College District 515,118 a case in which the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
university’s decision to move sexually explicit and racially offensive 
artwork, which was produced by a faculty member, out of a public and 
heavily trafficked thoroughfare.119  Writing for the court, Judge Posner 
noted that the term academic freedom is “equivocal” because “[i]t is used 
to denote both the freedom of the [institution] . . . and the freedom of the 
individual teacher . . . and these two freedoms are in conflict.”120  
However, as with other academic freedom cases, Judge Posner made no 
attempt to “resolve the purported conflict between the ‘two 
freedoms.’”121 
 The Supreme Court has lent some credence to Judge Posner’s 
formulation of academic freedom, albeit in a footnote that is best 
described as dicta.122  Ten days after denying certiorari to the Piarowski 
                                                          
freedom and that the court’s discussion of academic freedom is dicta because its decision did not 
depend on law pertaining to academic freedom). 
 115.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 67. 
 116.  See Neal H. Hutchens, A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The Uncertain Status 
of Constitutional Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 39 J.C. & U.L. 145, 154 (2009). 
 117.   Id. at 78. 
 118.   759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 119.   Id. at 632–33. 
 120.   Id. at 629 (citations omitted); see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 78–81 (quoting Piarowski, 
759 F.2d at 629) (explaining that the Piarowski decision “included language to the effect that 
academic freedom is an ‘equivocal’ term because it refers both to institutional academic freedom and 
individual academic freedom, and that these two freedoms conflict with each other” and criticizing 
the opinion’s characterization of academic freedom as “equivocal” (quoting Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 
629)). 
 121.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 81 (quoting Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629). 
 122.   See id. at 81–82. 
2017 THE CHILLING EFFECT OF CAMPUS CARRY 893 
case, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Ewing123 regarding due process in the 
university setting.124  There, Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous 
court, upheld the dismissal of a medical student after he failed a required 
examination.125  In the course of reaching this holding, Justice Stevens 
included a footnote in which he stated that “[a]cademic freedom thrives 
not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among 
teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on 
autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself.”126  Justice Stevens 
did not expand on his “somewhat inconsistently” language but many 
have taken his opinion as a quiet yet affirmative nod in favor of Judge 
Posner’s Piarowski doctrine.127 
b. The Fourth Circuit: Urofsky v. Gilmore 
 Finally and most recently, in Urofsky v. Gilmore,128 the Fourth 
Circuit weighed in on the academic freedom debate and the purported 
tension between institutional and individual academic freedom.129  The 
plaintiffs in this case were professors at public colleges and universities 
in Virginia who brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of a 
Virginia statute that prohibited them from accessing sexually explicit 
material on state computers, for work-related purposes, without prior 
approval from the university.130  The professors argued: 
[T]hat a university professor possesses a constitutional right to 
determine for himself, without the input of the university . . . the 
subjects of his research, writing, and teaching.  [The professors] 
maintain[ed] that by requiring professors to obtain university approval 
before accessing sexually explicit materials on the Internet in 
connection with their research, the [statute] infringe[d] this individual 
                                                          
 123.   474 U.S. 214 (1985) 
 124.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 81. 
 125.   See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 215–16, 221–23, 228. 
 126.   Id. at 226 n.12 (citations omitted).  See generally Hiers, supra note 80, at 81–82 (quoting 
and analyzing the same footnote from Ewing). 
 127.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 81–82 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12). 
 128.   216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Wilkins, J.) 
 129.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 95–104 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Urofsky 
extensively and highlighting the distinction between individual and institutional academic freedom 
explored in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion).  See generally Smith, supra note 54, at 336–60 (discussing 
the Urofsky case at length while strongly criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s opinion but not focusing on 
the distinction between individual and institutional academic freedom). 
 130.   Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404–05; see also Smith, supra note 54, at 336–37 (detailing the 
factual background of the Urofsky case). 
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right of academic freedom.131 
The court, however, disagreed and concluded “that to the extent the 
Constitution recognizes any right of ‘academic freedom’ above and 
beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the 
right inheres in the University, not in individual professors, and is not 
violated by the terms of the [statute].”132  The court went on to conclude 
that, while academic freedom has never been expressly defined, the case 
law that does exist “appears to have recognized only an institutional right 
of self-governance in academic affairs.”133 
 This ruling by the Fourth Circuit remains good law but it has faced 
heavy criticism from those who have argued that the Fourth Circuit 
improperly interpreted academic freedom jurisprudence when it declared 
that the case law supported institutional but not individual academic 
freedom.134  Instead the Supreme Court has focused on individual and 
institutional academic freedom equally, never clearly distinguishing one 
above the other.135  Proponents of this argument go on to state that the 
distinction between institutional and individual academic freedom is a 
false one, noting that “[a] professor’s freedom means little if her 
university is shackled by the whim of the state, and a university’s 
freedom means little if its professors are pawns of the state.”136  Other 
critics have argued that, while the distinction between individual and 
institutional academic freedom is a valid one, the individual component 
is not as easily swept aside as the Fourth Circuit makes it seem.137  
Rather the court should have recognized that individual academic 
freedom qualifies for First Amendment protection given that “the whole 
justification for academic freedom is that the professional speech of 
professors does concern the public.”138  Regardless of which argument is 
more compelling, both present strong cases undermining the Fourth 
                                                          
 131.   Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409–10. 
 132.   Id. at 410. 
 133.   See id. at 412. 
 134.   See, e.g., Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? 
Analyzing Professors’ Academic Freedom Rights Within the State’s Managerial Realm, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1061, 1102–07 (2003) (criticizing the Urofsky court because it “unnecessarily distinguished 
between the institutional and individual rights of academic freedom, and categorically denied the 
existence of the individual right” and partly blaming this mistake on the court’s incorrect 
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent regarding academic freedom). 
 135.   Id. at 1103. 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   See J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 
89–91, 112 (2004). 
 138.   Id. at 112. 
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Circuit’s ruling in Urofsky and potentially justify why the Fourth 
Circuit’s precedent has been slow to catch on. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 This part will analyze the Kansas campus carry statute by asking and 
answering three important questions.  The first section asks: Are 
university professors and faculty members entitled to an individual right 
of academic freedom?  The answer is almost assuredly yes, based on the 
historical context of academic freedom as well as the limited but still 
forceful Supreme Court jurisprudence that pertains to the doctrine.  The 
second section then asks: Assuming that individual academic freedom is 
a constitutional freedom, what level of scrutiny should courts apply when 
a government action allegedly infringes upon that freedom?  This 
Comment argues that when it comes to the Kansas campus carry statute, 
intermediate scrutiny should apply because the law is content-neutral but 
still has an incidental effect on speech.  Finally, the third section asks: 
Does the Kansas campus carry statute withstand intermediate scrutiny?  
This Comment argues that it does not because the statute does not further 
an important government interest and even if it did, its restrictions on 
speech are more than are necessary to do so.  Therefore, based on the 
analysis of these three questions, this part will conclude that the Kansas 
campus carry statute impermissibly violates the individual academic 
freedom of university professors and faculty members and therefore 
should be struck down. 
A. Does Individual Academic Freedom Exist? 
 Individual academic freedom is clearly contemplated and 
encompassed by both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 statement.139  In 
fact, both the 1915 Declaration and the 1940 statement focus almost 
exclusively on the academic freedom of individual professors, paying 
almost no attention to the academic freedom of the institution.140  
However, as noted above, the 1915 Declaration and 1940 statement are 
merely professional declarations, both of which lack legal effect unless 
they are incorporated into official university policies or employment 
                                                          
 139.   See Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors , supra 
note 67; Statement of Principles, 1940, supra note 74. 
 140.   See sources cited supra note 139; see also Smith, supra note 54, at 310–13 (describing 
both the 1915 Declaration and 1940 statement as focused on individual academic freedom); 
Spurgeon, supra note 62, at 123–24, 124 n.90 (explaining how the focus of the 1915 Declaration was 
on professors, not students or institutions). 
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contracts.141  The Supreme Court has weighed in on the issue but its 
academic freedom jurisprudence is less clear than either of the 
professional standards, leaving an ambiguity within the law that has yet 
to be resolved. 
 In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York,142 
the Supreme Court provided its most clear and complete explanation of 
academic freedom to date.143  There the Court stated that the United 
States “is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is 
of transcendent value to all [Americans] and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.  That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom.”144  By couching academic freedom within the scope 
of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court was implying that academic 
freedom should be considered a constitutional freedom.145  That freedom 
was intended “to be enjoyed in the first instance by teachers” largely 
because of the vital role they play in ensuring the future of American 
democracy.146  The Court emphasized this conclusion by quoting directly 
from the Sweezy plurality, stating that “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in 
an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must 
always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new 
maturity and understanding; otherwise . . . civilization will stagnate and 
die.”147  However, despite this seemingly clear nod in favor of individual 
academic freedom, a circuit split has developed over whether the 
Supreme Court intended to include individual academic freedom as a 
constitutional freedom within the scope of the First Amendment. 
                                                          
 141.   See Smith, supra note 54, at 312–13; see also Spurgeon, supra note 62, at 128–29 (stating 
that the AAUP and its policy documents are not legally enforceable). 
 142.   385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 143.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 41–43; White, supra note 77, at 810–12. 
 144.   Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; see also J. Peter Byrne, supra note 102, at 296–98 (quoting 
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (making several observations about the quoted passage from Keyishian); 
Hiers, supra note 80, at 42–43 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (discussing and explaining the 
importance of the quoted passage from Keyishian); White, supra note 77, at 810–12 (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (discussing the place of the quoted passage from 
Keyishian in the context of academic freedom). 
 145.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 35–36. 
 146.   See id. at 42–43 (emphasis omitted). 
 147.   Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) 
(plurality opinion)); see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 42–43 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 
(quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250)) (analyzing the language of the paragraph of Sweezy quoted by the 
Court in Keyishian). 
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1. The Circuit Split 
 This split among the circuit courts stems largely from the ambiguous 
nature of the Supreme Court’s academic freedom jurisprudence as well 
as the relatively unclear dichotomy—between individual and institutional 
academic freedom—that has emerged as a result.148  As noted earlier, the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in the case of Urofsky v. Gilmore149 went “so 
far as to declare that academic freedom belongs exclusively to 
institutions, and that faculty are not, and never have been, entitled to 
academic freedom.”150  The Fourth Circuit specifically concluded, “that 
to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of ‘academic freedom’ 
above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is 
entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual 
professors.”151  In reaching this conclusion, the Urofsky court 
emphasized that the academic freedom jurisprudence does not create a 
new First Amendment right for university professors but rather only 
grants them the limited First Amendment rights enjoyed by all public 
employees.152  Therefore, as the court noted, “[t]he Supreme Court, to the 
extent it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, 
appears to have recognized only an institutional right.”153 
 By contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Piarowski v. Illinois 
Community College District 515,154 stated that the term “academic 
freedom” was “equivocal.”155  Drawing on the Supreme Court’s language 
in Sweezy, Judge Posner characterized academic freedom as both the 
freedom of the institution as well as the freedom of the individual teacher 
and then posited that each is in conflict with the other.156  The Supreme 
Court lent some credence to this interpretation, albeit in a footnote that 
                                                          
 148.  See generally Hiers, supra note 80, at 64–109. 
 149.   216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
 150.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 36; see also Gose Lynch, supra note 134, at 1102, 1107; White, 
supra note 77, at 833–34; supra also Section II.B.2.b. 
 151.   Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410.   
 152.   See id. at 410–15; see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 36 (“[Urofsky] suggests that college 
and university faculty are entitled only to the same limited First Amendment speech protections 
enjoyed by public employees in other contexts . . . .”). 
 153.   Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412. 
 154.  759 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 155.   Id. at 629; see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 78–81 (quoting Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629). 
 156.   Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629; see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 78 (“[Piarowski] included 
language to the effect that academic freedom is an ‘equivocal’ term because it refers both to 
institutional academic freedom and individual academic freedom, and that these two freedoms 
conflict with each other.” (quoting Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629)). 
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was merely dicta, in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing157 where 
Justice Stevens acknowledged that “[a]cademic freedom thrives not only 
on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers 
and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous 
decisionmaking by the [institution] itself.”158  Justice Stevens did not 
specifically cite to Judge Posner’s decision in Piarowski (though the 
Supreme Court had denied certiorari to that case just ten days prior159), 
nor did he expand on what he meant by his “somewhat inconsistently” 
language.160  But despite this, many commentators have pointed to the 
Ewing footnote as the Supreme Court’s implicit recognition of individual 
academic freedom as a valid constitutional freedom within the scope of 
the First Amendment.161 
2. Resolving the Conflict 
 The American academic freedom jurisprudence is necessarily 
couched in the historical context that the doctrine grew up in.  Therefore, 
that historical context must be considered when resolving questions 
about the scope of the doctrine, including the split between the Fourth 
and Seventh Circuits over whether individual academic freedom should 
be included as a constitutional freedom within the purview of the First 
Amendment.  Ultimately the Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgement that 
individual academic freedom is valid and within the scope of the First 
Amendment is more in line with this historical context and therefore 
finds more support in the case law.  As a result, individual academic 
freedom should be recognized as, at the very least, equal to institutional 
academic freedom and therefore protected as a “special concern of the 
First Amendment.”162 
 Beginning with the German tradition, there is a clear emphasis 
                                                          
 157.  474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
 158.   Id. at 226 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted); see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 81–82 (quoting 
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12) (discussing Justice Stevens’ footnote in Ewing and describing it as 
dicta). 
 159.   Hiers, supra note 80, at 81. 
 160.   Id. at 82. 
 161.   See, e.g., Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment Showdown: Intellectual Diversity 
Mandates and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 321,  356, 356 n.270 (2008); see 
also White, supra note 77, at 824 (explaining that Ewing is “characterized by some scholars as the 
high water mark for academic freedom as an individual right possessed by individual members of 
the faculty”). 
 162.   See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating 
that academic freedom is “a special concern of the First Amendment” but not explicitly stating that 
individual academic freedom specifically is such a concern). 
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placed on the academic freedom of the individual.  Two of the three 
principles—Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit—focused almost exclusively on 
individual academic freedom.163  The former, Lehrfreiheit, emphasized 
the freedom of individual professors and faculty members and granted 
them the right to teach their discipline in the manner of their choosing 
and to control the learning environment of their classrooms, all without 
fear of state or church retribution.164  The latter, Lernfreiheit, while not as 
relevant as Lehrfreiheit to the topic of this Comment, also emphasized 
the academic freedom of an individual.165  Specifically, Lernfreiheit 
referred to the freedom of a student to study the topic of his or her 
choosing without being subjected to university direction, save for those 
courses that were required to prepare students for professional 
examinations or licenses.166  Given that these German principles heavily 
influenced the development of the American academic freedom 
doctrine,167 it is telling that they put such an emphasis on the rights of the 
individual. 
 As the concept of academic freedom migrated to the United States, it 
brought many of its German influences and characteristics along with 
it.168  Based on those German influences and characteristics, the AAUP 
issued its 1915 Declaration,169 the first conception of academic freedom 
in the United States.170  The 1915 Declaration emphasized three main 
elements: “[1] freedom of inquiry and research; [2] freedom of teaching 
within the university or college; and [3] freedom of extra-mural utterance 
and action.”171  Each element focuses almost exclusively on the 
individual academic freedom of professors.172  In fact, while the 1915 
Declaration discusses the role that academic institutions play and 
describes, at length, their overarching function, it does not include any 
provision proposing any kind of institutional academic freedom.173  
                                                          
 163.   See Metzger, supra note 55, at 1269–70. 
 164.   See id.  
 165.   See id. at 1270. 
 166.   See id. 
 167.   See Smith, supra note 54, at 309. 
 168.   See id. 
 169.   Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 67. 
 170.   See Metzger, supra note 55, at 1267; Smith, supra note 54, at 310;  
 171.   Comm. on Acad. Freedom & Acad. Tenure, Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 67, 
at 20. 
 172.   See id. (“It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the subject of this report 
is that of the teacher.  Academic freedom in this sense comprises three elements: freedom of inquiry 
and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extra-mural 
utterance and action.”). 
 173.   See id. at 20–42; see also Smith, supra note 54, at 311 (“[T]he AAUP protected the 
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Given that the AAUP is a professional organization representing college 
professors, this largely makes sense.  The AAUP re-emphasized its 1915 
Declaration with its 1940 statement that, again, focused almost 
exclusively on the individual academic freedom of university faculty and 
professors.174  Therefore, particularly when combined with the German 
tradition, the historical background and context surrounding the 
American conception of academic freedom weighs heavily in favor of 
including individual academic freedom in the modern day definition of 
the doctrine.175 
 It was against this historical backdrop that the Supreme Court based 
most, if not all, of its academic freedom jurisprudence.  Though many 
commentators have often lamented the ambiguous nature and lack of 
clarity that accompanies the Supreme Court’s academic freedom 
decisions,176 the Court’s language, particularly in the context of the 
historical precedent, leans strongly in favor of individual academic 
freedom.  Specifically, in Keyishian the Supreme Court characterized 
academic freedom as “a special concern of the First Amendment, which 
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom.”177  This language lends credence to the idea that academic 
freedom should be included among the constitutional freedoms and 
therefore afforded all of the protections that those freedoms inherently 
entail.178 
 What this oft-quoted passage does not do, however, is clearly state 
who is entitled to assert that freedom: just the academic institutions or 
the individual faculty and professors as well?  The Court fails to directly 
answer this question, which results in the above-mentioned circuit split 
                                                          
individual professor rather than the university in its institutional capacity.”); Spurgeon, supra note 
62, at 124 n.90 (explaining that the 1915 Declaration did not concern itself with institutional 
academic freedom). 
 174.   See Statement of Principles, 1940, supra note 74; see also Smith, supra note 54, at 312 
(“[T]he 1940 Statement treated academic freedom as the individual freedom of university 
professors.”). 
 175.   See Smith, supra note 54, at 309 (“[T]he American definition of academic freedom was 
more focused than its German precursor in that the American theory centered almost exclusively on 
the freedom of the individual teacher and researcher.”). 
 176.   See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 102, at 252–53; Smith, supra note 54, at 324–25; Spurgeon, 
supra note 62, at 141; White, supra note 77, at 812–13, 841–42. 
 177.   Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also 
Byrne, supra note 102, at 296–98 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (highlighting a few aspects 
of the quoted passage from Keyishian); Hiers, supra note 80, at 42–43 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. 
at 603) (examining the quoted passage from Keyishian and explaining its importance); White, supra 
note 77, at 810–12 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (placing the quoted 
passage from Keyishian in the broader context of academic freedom). 
 178.   See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text.  
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between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.179  But what the Court does do 
is follow its seminal statement on academic freedom with a quote from 
its earlier plurality decision in Sweezy v. New Hampshire180: 
 The essentiality of freedom in the community of American 
universities is almost self-evident.  No one should underestimate the 
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train 
our youth.  To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.  
No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new 
discoveries cannot yet be made.  Particularly is that true in the social 
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.  
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.  
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and 
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.181 
By including the Sweezy plurality quotation in its holding, the Keyishian 
Court made that language a part of its academic freedom precedent.182  
This is significant because the Sweezy quote specifically mentions 
teachers, and others involved with educating American youth, as vital 
components of a vibrant democracy.183  They must therefore “always 
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise . . . civilization will stagnate and die.”184  
Ultimately, this language makes clear that individual academic freedom 
is and should be included as a constitutional freedom within the purview 
of the First Amendment.185  And when put into the historical context that 
has surrounded academic freedom since its inception, the conclusion that 
individual faculty members and professors are entitled to their own, 
                                                          
 179.   See discussion supra Section III.A.1. 
 180.   354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 181.   Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250); see also Hiers, supra note 
80, at 42–43 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250)) (analyzing the 
above language from Sweezy quoted in Keyishian and concluding that the Keyishian opinion in 
general demonstrates the high value placed by the Court on the academic freedom of teachers).  
 182.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 43 (“By virtue of its quotation with obvious approval by 
the Keyishian majority, this language from the Sweezy plurality became the language of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 183.   See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 40, 42–43; Smith, supra 
note 54, at 318–19 (“The passionate language in [Sweezy] extols the virtues of academic freedom by 
recognizing the importance to society of individual scholarship.”). 
 184.   Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250; see also Hiers, supra note 80, at 40, 44–45 (quoting Sweezy, 354 
U.S. at 250) (analyzing the relevant language from Sweezy and focusing on the decision’s focus on 
protecting the academic freedom of professors); Smith, supra note 54, at 318–19 (quoting Sweezy, 
354 U.S. at 250) (discussing the passage from Sweezy and concluding that the Court’s decision is 
about “the importance to society of individual scholarship.”). 
 185.   See Hiers, supra note 80, at 40–45; Smith, supra note 54, at 318–21.  
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individual right of academic freedom is nearly unassailable. 
B. If Individual Academic Freedom Exists, What Level of Scrutiny 
Should the Courts Apply? 
 Having established that individual academic freedom is almost 
certainly included as a constitutional freedom within the scope of the 
First Amendment, the question then becomes: What level of scrutiny 
should a court apply to laws and regulations that are alleged to have 
infringed upon that freedom?  To “reconcile individual liberties with 
societal needs,” courts utilize so-called levels, or tiers, of scrutiny.186  
“These tiers were created by the Supreme Court to formalize the 
jurisprudence of rights, and reconcile the general presumption of 
constitutionality and deference to legislative bodies with the inherently 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial review.”187  The baseline of these 
levels of scrutiny is rational basis review, a “highly deferential” level of 
scrutiny that only requires that the statute be “rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”188  However, “[a]lthough rational basis review 
provide[s] an acceptable starting point for analysis in most cases,” in 
reality it plays an “extremely limited role” when it comes to decisions 
involving free speech.189  As a result, courts are left with strict and 
intermediate scrutiny for evaluating free speech claims.190 
1. Strict Scrutiny 
 Strict Scrutiny constitutes the most exacting test that a court can 
apply to an infringing statute.  To satisfy strict scrutiny analysis, a law 
must have been passed to further a “compelling governmental interest; 
must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest; and, must be the least 
restrictive means of advancing that interest.”191  This is an incredibly 
high standard to meet, so high in fact that many consider it to be a test 
that is “fatal in fact,” resulting in per se findings that statutes are 
unconstitutional.192  When it comes to free speech, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 186.   Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 784. 
 187.   Id. 
 188.   See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Bhagwat, supra note 
186, at 784, 786 (quoting Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303). 
 189.   See Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 786–87. 
 190.   See id. at 784, 786–88. 
 191.   16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 480 (2017). 
 192.   See Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 784 (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
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has held that strict scrutiny applies when a statute imposes content-based 
restrictions on speech.193  “As a general rule, laws that by their terms 
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the 
ideas or views expressed are content based.”194  Similarly, laws that 
“restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content” are also disfavored and subjected to strict scrutiny analysis 
by the courts.195  Examples of state action that has failed to satisfy the 
courts’ exacting strict scrutiny analysis include regulations that limit 
programming on sexually explicit channels to certain hours196 and police 
regulations that only permit schools to be picketed when the picketing 
pertains to labor disputes but does not permit picketing at schools for 
other reasons.197  And in terms of individual academic freedom, a statute 
that seeks to mandate what can or cannot be taught in college classrooms 
would likely be subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 
 The Kansas campus carry statute is almost certainly not subject to 
strict scrutiny analysis because it is, facially, a content-neutral statute.  
Section 75-7c20 does not try to regulate any specific type of speech or 
form of expression by mandating that concealed carry may only be 
prohibited in classrooms that teach certain subjects (i.e. concealed carry 
firearms may be prohibited in calculus classes but not in English classes) 
or in classes taught by teachers who possess certain political beliefs (i.e. 
conservative professors may prohibit concealed carry firearms in their 
classrooms but liberal professors may not).198  Nor does section 75-7c20 
seek to make arbitrary distinctions between different types of speech.199  
Instead, the statute uses an objective standard (i.e. public buildings that 
                                                          
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1972)). 
 193.   See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (first citing Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); then 
citing Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125–26 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); and then 
citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); 16A AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law § 480 (2017); Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 787. 
 194.   Turner, 512 U.S. at 643 (first citing Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992); and 
then citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1988) (plurality opinion)).  
 195.   See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (first citing Cohen v. 
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); then citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); then citing 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964); then citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 445 (1963); then citing Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1962); then citing Terminiello 
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); and then citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 
(1937)). 
 196.   See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806–07, 826–27 (2000). 
 197.   See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94–99. 
 198.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20 (Supp. 2016). 
 199.   See id. 
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have adequate security measures) to determine where concealed carry 
may be prohibited and where it must be allowed.200  In fact, section 75-
7c20 makes absolutely no mention of free speech, nor in any other way 
implicates the rights protected by the First Amendment.201  Instead, the 
statute’s language is almost entirely focused on implementing the new 
policy.  This includes provisions detailing where concealed carry can and 
cannot be prohibited, language about the authority of judges and 
corrections officers to limit the scope of the new policy, and instructions 
for building and campus administrators on how to apply for and obtain 
the four-year exemption from the policy that is set to expire on July 1, 
2017.202  To apply strict scrutiny analysis to the Kansas campus carry 
statute would therefore be too high of a burden to place on a law that 
does not directly infringe upon the individual academic freedom of 
Kansas professors. 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny 
 Intermediate scrutiny was developed by the Supreme Court as a 
combination of “the highly deferential rational basis review and the 
almost always ‘fatal in fact’ strict scrutiny” analysis.203  This was largely 
because, “[w]hatever the merits of the two-tiered paradigm in due 
process and equal protection analysis, in the area of free speech it was 
never adequate to explain the subtleties of the Court’s jurisprudence.”204  
To satisfy intermediate scrutiny analysis, a challenged statute must 
further an important government interest that is not related to suppressing 
free expression and the restriction must be “no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.”205 
 When it comes to free speech, the Supreme Court has held that 
intermediate scrutiny applies to statutes that are content-neutral and yet 
                                                          
 200.   See id. 
 201.   See id. 
 202.   See id. 
 203.   See Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 784–85 (footnote omitted) (quoting Gunther, supra note 
192, at 8). The two-tiered paradigm, which had worked well for Due Process and Equal Protection 
analysis, failed to effectively handle the subtleties of the the Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence.  Id. at 784.  This led to a period of judicial chaos, during which time courts developed 
a number of tests, each designed to deal with a unique component of free speech law.  Id.  
“However, in the early to mid-1980s, the Supreme Court, and even more so the lower courts, began 
to bring order to this tangle, ultimately combining these various ‘tests’ into a single, unitary standard 
of review that has come to be called intermediate scrutiny.”  Id. 
 204.   Id. at 784. 
 205.   See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 480 (2017). 
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are still alleged to infringe upon free speech.206 
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases 
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether 
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.  The government’s purpose 
is the controlling consideration.  A regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has 
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.207 
The Court chose to make this distinction largely because it reasoned that 
content-neutral regulations posed “a less substantial risk of excising 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.”208  In other words, 
if the express purpose of the government action was not to compel or 
prohibit speech, then courts were more inclined to be deferential in 
accommodating the government’s interest.209  For this reason, the Court 
has applied intermediate scrutiny to a statute requiring cable providers to 
carry certain programming210 and municipal noise regulations designed 
to ensure that music performances did not disturb local residents211 and, 
in both instances, allowed the regulations to stand.212 
 In the context of academic freedom, statutes with the stated purpose 
of promoting student and faculty safety but that also have incidental 
effects on the individual academic freedom (i.e. the speech) of professors 
would likely be subject to this level of scrutiny.  As a result, it is 
arguable that the Kansas campus carry statute would have to withstand 
intermediate scrutiny to remain viable if it were to be challenged on 
individual academic freedom grounds.  This is largely because, as noted 
above, section 75-7c20 is inarguably content-neutral in its approach as 
well as in its application.213  It does not include any provision favoring or 
disfavoring any particular subjects or topics, nor does it grant special 
privileges or more severe restrictions based on the subject matter of the 
courses being taught.214  And yet, despite this neutrality, it cannot be 
                                                          
 206.   See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (first citing Clark v. 
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); and then citing Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981)). 
 207.   Id. (citation omitted) (first citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
295 (1984); and then citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986)). 
 208.   See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
 209.  See id. 
 210.   See id. at 662–68. 
 211.   See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). 
 212.   See cases cited supra notes 210–11. 
 213.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20 (Supp. 2016); see also supra Section III.B.1. 
 214.   See § 75-7c20; see also discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
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ignored that section 75-7c20 will, in all likelihood, have an incidental 
and chilling effect on the topics professors are willing to cover in their 
classrooms, the types of discussions professors are willing to facilitate 
among their students, and the type of environment professors choose to 
create within their classes.215  In other words, section 75-7c20 almost 
certainly infringes, albeit incidentally, on the academic freedom of 
individual professors and faculty members.  As a result, if the law were 
to be challenged on individual academic freedom grounds, it would have 
to withstand intermediate scrutiny in order to remain viable. 
C. Does the Kansas Campus Carry Statute Survive Intermediate 
Scrutiny? 
 As noted above, the test that must be satisfied to withstand 
intermediate scrutiny analysis first requires content-neutral statutes that 
nevertheless incidentally restrict speech to further an important 
governmental interest that is not related to the suppression of that free 
expression.216  Second, the incidental restriction on speech must be “no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that” important 
governmental interest.217 
1. Further an Important Governmental Interest Not Related to 
Suppressing Free Expression 
 For the Kansas campus carry statute to withstand heightened 
scrutiny, the government must first demonstrate that it furthers an 
important governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of 
                                                          
 215.   See Kent Anderson, Dare I Say This? – The Chilling Effect of Gun Laws on Academic 
Free Speech, SCHOLARLY KITCHEN (Nov. 5, 2014), 
https://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2014/11/05/dare-i-say-this-the-chilling-effect-of-gun-laws-on-
academic-free-speech/; Ian Bogost, The Armed Campus in the Anxiety Age, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/campus-carry-anxiety-age/472920/; 
Firmin Debrabander, How Guns Could Censor College Classrooms, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/the-steep-cost-of-allowing-guns-in-the-
college-classroom/472296/; Katie Reilly, How Guns on Campus Could Change What Texas 
Teaches, TIME (Feb. 26, 2016, 2:18 PM), http://time.com/4237638/campus-carry-texas-universities/; 
Benjamin Wermund, UH Faculty Suggest Steering Clear of Some Topics if Students Armed, CHRON 
(Feb. 24, 2016, 8:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/local/education/campus-chronicles/article/UH-
faculty-may-drop-topics-from-curriculum-as-6849002.php.  While it is true that many of these 
concerns are based on fears for the future rather than concrete (and inherently retrospective) data or 
survey results, the fact is that the campus carry movement is so new, so that type of data simply does 
not yet exist.  
 216.   See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 480 (2017). 
 217.   See id. 
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free expression.218  To this end, the State would likely posit that the 
Kansas campus carry statute furthers the safety of its citizens by enabling 
them to defend themselves against armed assailants on public college and 
university campuses.219  However, while safety is an important 
governmental interest and is clearly not related to the suppression of free 
expression; in reality, allowing concealed carry firearms on campuses 
would likely do little to further that governmental interest (i.e. make 
those campuses safer) and may, arguably, have the exact opposite effect.  
The statistics from the FBI suggest that carrying a firearm has, at most, a 
negligible effect at deterring crime and making citizens safer.220  In fact, 
empirical studies go even further and have discovered a correlation 
between guns and accidental shootings/suicides, suggesting that the more 
guns present in a society, the more suicides and accidental shootings that 
occur.221  Therefore, while the safety of citizens is an important 
governmental interest, the Kansas campus carry statute likely does not do 
anything to further that interest and may even prove detrimental, 
particularly when it comes to college campuses. 
 As noted above, universities, such as the University of Kansas, are 
made up of a unique conglomeration of people who come together from 
a wide variety of cultures and backgrounds and who carry with them a 
wide variety of beliefs.222  Part of the purpose of college is to expose 
students to those different cultures and backgrounds in a manner that 
forces them to constantly challenge each other’s beliefs, deal with 
uncomfortable political and social issues, and re-evaluate how they see 
the world.  At best this results in a campus full of thinkers and innovators 
who are able to appreciate and see the world from various perspectives.  
But in getting to that point there are often hurdles that must be overcome, 
                                                          
 218.   See id. 
 219.   See Zeff, supra note 47; Rothschild, supra note 10.. 
 220.   See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., FIREARM JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES AND NON-FATAL SELF-
DEFENSE GUN USE: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY DATA 7 (2015), http://www.vpc.org/studies/justifiable15.pdf/ (“The idea 
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spaces and even to prevent the regulation of military-style semiautomatic assault weapons and high-
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million guns, how rarely firearms are used in self-defense.”). 
 221.   See Harvard Injury Control Research Center: Accidents, HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. 
HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/firearms-research/gun-threats-and-self-defense-gun-
use/ (last visited May 11, 2017); Harvard Injury Control Research Center: Suicide, HARV. T.H. 
CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/firearms-research/gun-ownership-
and-use/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). 
 222.   See supra Part I. 
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emotions that must be dealt with, and discomfort that must be worked 
through.  It is therefore arguable, and even likely, that introducing 
concealed carry firearms into this already volatile environment will make 
it feel less safe and result in the loss of the free exchange of ideas that 
universities have prided themselves on for centuries.223 
2. No More than the Essential Restrictions Necessary to Further That 
Interest 
 Even if the Kansas campus carry statute does further the 
government’s important interest in protecting its citizens, it still very 
likely fails under intermediate scrutiny because its restrictions go beyond 
that which are necessary to bring about that protection.  This is largely 
due to the dubiousness of the premise that armed students and faculty 
make a campus safer,224 as well as the existence of more reasonable 
alternative means for achieving the same goal.  As noted previously, it is 
very unlikely that adding more guns to a university setting will make it 
safer, particularly since most students and faculty lack training in how to 
properly respond to an active shooter situation.225  And yet, despite this 
shortcoming, the Kansas legislature chose campus carry as its preferred 
vehicle for improving campus safety.  The effect of that choice is a very 
real restriction on the academic freedom of professors because, for many, 
it limits the subjects they are willing to teach as well as the types of 
discussions they are willing to facilitate among their students.226  In 
particular, it dissuades professors from lecturing on important but 
controversial topics or taking positions that might be met with angry and, 
                                                          
 223.   See Shaundra K. Lewis & Daniel Alejandro De Luna, Symposium on “Texas Gun Law and 
the Future”: The Fatal Flaws in Texas’s Campus Carry Law, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 138–40 
(2016).  The authors specifically note that the Texas campus carry statute has already had an 
appreciable impact on subjects professors are willing to teach, how accessible professors are willing 
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impact with their students.  Id. at 138–39.  Some professors have reportedly even left the state to 
take up teaching positions in less volatile environments.  Id. at 139.  Ultimately, the authors conclude 
that “[i]n sum, [the campus carry statute] negatively impacts the quality of higher education students 
will receive, which . . . violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.”  Id. at 140.  This 
conclusion—which was made in the context of the Texas campus carry statute—is equally 
applicable to the Kansas campus carry statute. 
 224.  See sources cited supra notes 220–21. 
 225.   See Rebekah Elliott, Note, The Real School Safety Debate: Why Legislative Responses 
Should Focus on Schools and Not on Guns, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 523, 549 (2015) (“An investigation 
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 226.   See sources cited supra note 215. 
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under the Kansas campus carry statute, potentially armed resistance.227  
When the alternatives are considered, it is clear that these restrictions go 
beyond what is necessary to further the government’s interest in 
improving campus safety. 
 One such alternative is investing in campus law enforcement and 
putting more officers who are trained and prepared to handle active 
shooter situations on campuses.228  There is little doubt that this would 
further the state’s interest and in a way that has little to no effect on the 
subject matter professors are willing to teach or the learning environment 
they wish to create.229  Other alternatives include investing in mental 
health care230 and education about non-violent dispute resolution, both of 
which would effectuate the goal of campus safety without restricting the 
individual academic freedom of professors.231  The Kansas campus carry 
statute is therefore more restrictive than is necessary to further the state’s 
interest in promoting campus safety by enabling students and faculty 
members to defend themselves.  This means that section 75-7c20 must 
ultimately fail under intermediate scrutiny analysis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Beginning with the great German universities of the 19th Century, 
the doctrine of academic freedom has sought to protect the academic 
integrity and free-exchange of ideas that is central to the concept of 
higher education.232  Early in the 20th Century, that doctrine migrated to 
the United States where it first manifested within professional standards 
that were produced by labor organizations representing university 
                                                          
 227.   See sources cited supra note 215. 
 228.   See Brandi Hephner LeBanc, Kerry Brian Melear & Brian O. Hemphill, The Debate Over 
Campus-Based Gun Control Legislation, 40 J.C. & U.L. 397, 412–14 (2014) (noting the key role that 
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 230.   See Tessa Heller, Note, Mandatory School-Based Mental Health Services and the 
Prevention of School Violence, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 279, 282–83, 315 (2014) (arguing that 
diagnosing and treating mental illnesses earlier in children can help them “better cope with mental 
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 231.   See LeBanc, Melear & Hemphill, supra note 228, at 413 (“A recent study found that in 33 
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 232.   See discussion supra Section II.B.1.a. 
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professors and faculty members.233  Both of these historical conceptions 
of academic freedom—the German tradition and the subsequent 
professional standards—placed a clear emphasis on the protection of the 
rights of individual professors to teach and exchange ideas freely and 
without fear of negative repercussions.234  However, unless those 
standards were incorporated into university policy or employment 
contracts, they largely lacked any type of real legal effect.235  That began 
to change in the 1950s and continued through the 1970s as the Supreme 
Court took up the issue.236  What resulted was a somewhat tenuous 
acceptance of academic freedom in which the Court acknowledged that 
academic freedom was essential to the furtherance and future of 
democracy and, as a result, was a special concern of the First 
Amendment.237  Unfortunately, the Court has yet to clarify what it meant 
with this ambiguous embrace of academic freedom doctrine, but given 
the historical background and context that surrounded the Court’s 
decisions, it seems clear that individual academic freedom is included as 
a constitutional freedom within the scope of the First Amendment.238 
 Because individual academic freedom is a valid constitutional 
freedom within the purview of the First Amendment, any statutes or 
government actions that infringe upon that right must withstand the 
appropriate level of scrutiny, as determined by the Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence.239  This includes the Kansas campus carry 
statute that was passed and implemented in 2013, and that will require all 
public universities within the state of Kansas to allow the concealed 
carry of firearms beginning on July 1, 2017.240  If a court were to deem 
the Kansas campus carry statute to be a content-based regulation, then it 
would be subject to strict scrutiny and could only be upheld if it is shown 
to further a compelling government interest by means that are narrowly 
tailored to that interest and that are the least restrictive means of doing 
so.241  This is an incredibly exacting test, but the Kansas campus carry 
statute would likely not be held to that high of a standard.242  This is 
largely because the Kansas campus carry statute is almost certainly a 
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content-neutral statute.243  Content-neutral statutes are facially indifferent 
to the content of speech and most, including the Kansas campus carry 
statute, make no mention of speech in their provisions.244 
 When content-neutral laws infringe upon a First Amendment right, 
such as the individual academic freedom of professors, they are still 
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny, but not to the essentially fatal-
in-fact strict scrutiny analysis.245  This middle ground test is known as 
intermediate scrutiny and requires the infringing statute to further an 
important governmental interest that is not related to suppressing speech 
by means that only restrict a person’s rights to the extent necessary to 
further that interest.246 
 Ultimately, the Kansas campus carry statute must fail, even under the 
intermediate scrutiny analysis, because it does not further an important 
governmental interest and, even if it did, it does so in a manner that is far 
more restrictive than necessary.247  The government’s central interest in 
enacting the statute was to promote the safety of its citizens by allowing 
them to better defend themselves against armed assailants in buildings on 
college and university campuses.248  However, empirical evidence 
suggests that allowing firearms on campus will actually have the 
opposite effect mostly due to the increase in accidents and suicides that 
are associated with an increase in guns.249  In addition, even if it did 
make campuses safer, the Kansas campus carry statute is far too 
restrictive to be allowed to stand under intermediate scrutiny.250  This is 
particularly true when looking at alternatives—such as investing in law 
enforcement on campus, mental health care, and education in non-violent 
conflict resolution—all of which improve campus safety with little to no 
restrictions on the academic freedom of individual professors.251  As a 
result, the Kansas campus carry statute likely fails intermediate scrutiny 
analysis and should be set aside because it unacceptably infringes on the 
individual academic freedom of professors and faculty members at 
public colleges and universities throughout the state. 
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